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When it is as hot as in Kyiv these days, and when the summer vacation time sweeps all news from the
country's political frontlines, decision-makers and policy-influencers who - for the reasons of the
election campaign or the need to show action in combating yet another wave of crisis - have not been
lucky enough to leave the city for a short break, find themselves in the spotlight, no matter how trivial
and artificial their sensations are.
The last days of July presented journalists with a "rebellion" in the top offices of the Ukrainian
government and the subsequent dismissal of First Vice Prime Minister Volodymyr Kuratchenko. At the
session of the government, the official publicly called for a radical change of the official policy line,
proposing "correction" of the current course. In general, there was nothing new in Mr. Kuratchenko's
agenda: it was a peculiar mixture of reasonable ideas and overtly left-wing populist declarations that
lacked originality and offered no implementation mechanisms. On the one hand, Mr. Kuratchenko
called for creating a mechanism for overcoming the non-payment crisis, taking measures to ensure
more effective management of state-owned property, providing for economic liquidity of enterprises,
launching thorough modernization of production processes, developing and adopting a zero-deficit
budget, changing the main focus of the taxation system from purely fiscal to regulating and stimulating,
developing of a mechanism of drafting and implementation of the government's decisions in conditions
of the freedom of speech, a multi-partisan legislature, active political parties and opposition. On the
other hand - he called for revision of the memoranda with the IMF and the World Bank, as well as for
restoration, "on a new basis", of national economic planning, development of detailed annual plans, a
greater regulating and coordinating role of the government and more independence for the government
in development of economic policy and economic decision-making. Other calls that were sure to
alienate the majority of the government included revision of the National Bank's monetary, credit and
fiscal policies and reform the policy of setting the national currency exchange rate. The call for
restructuring Ukraine's foreign debt for three to five years was also not new, but combining it with
attacks on the main international donors was hardly a was to secure concessions. The timing could
hardly be worse: Mr. Kuratchenko made his anti-market statements at an official meeting of the
Cabinet of Ministers on the eve of arrival of the IMF mission to Ukraine, when the preparation for the
IMF board meeting supposed to consider providing Ukraine with a new EFF tranche was in process.
Mr. Kuratchenko has never been regarded as an influential power broker or smart politician. Yet, he
occupied a number of senior positions and was in charge of a number of key issues. Radio engineer,
educated at the Zaporizhya Machine-Building Institute, he belonged to the local industrial-
nomenclatura elite, the "sister elite" of Dnipropetrovsk. His political career began to develop rapidly in
early 1980s, after he "performed the government's tasks in Afghanistan", as official chronicle put it. In
a few years upon his return he was promoted to secretary for industrial affairs of the Zaporizhya
Communist Party Committee. Two years later he got the position of an inspector at the CPU Central
Committee, then went to work as secretary for industrial affairs of the Transcarpathian Communist
party obkom, and in 1990 finally returned to his "Radiopribor" plant as the director general. His
political career received a new boost in late 1996, when he joined the People's Democratic Party and
occupied the 35th place in the party's election list. In December 1996, Mr. Kuratchenko was appointed
to the position of Deputy Minister for machine Building, the Military-Industrial Complex and
Conversion. A year later he became First Deputy Minister of the Industrial Policy of Ukraine. After the
PDP's remarkable failure to receive substantial number of votes in the 1998 parliamentary election, Mr.
Kuratchenko was appointed to the position of the head of the Zaporizhya regional state administration.
Although repeatedly criticized and formally reprimanded for the region's failure to pay its energy debts,
in January 1999 he substituted Anatoly Holubchenko at the position of the First Vice Prime Minister.
Other positions he "inherited" from Mr. Holubchenko included those of chairman of the government's
Commission for Export Control Policy, chairman the State Commission for Transportation Corridors,
chairman of the Interbranch Commission for Navigation and Transportation Management, chairman of
the Ukrainian part of the Ukrainian-Turkmen Commission for Economic Cooperation (involved
primarily in facilitating the supply of Turkmenian gas to Ukraine), chairman of the State Commission
for Communication and Frequency, chairman of the commission for coordination of activities of
ministries and other central executive bodies connected with the implementation of the National
Industrial Policy Concept. From former Minister of the Cabinet of Ministers Anatoly Minchenko, he
"inherited" the position of chairman of the Coordination Council for Implementation of the Credit
Agreement with the EBRD, established to supervise the reconstruction of Ukraine's energy industry.
Mr. Kuratchenko's other responsibilities included supervision of development of the space industry;
prevention of possible impacts of the "Problem 2000"; control of the repayment of the government-
insured foreign loan to the Lysychansk oil refinery complex, the Lysychansknaftoorgsyntez; control
over the payment of wage arrears to miners; mediation of the crisis in the coal mining industry,
implementation of the TACIS - INOGANE projects of transportation of oil and gas to Europe; ensuring
stabilization of the electric energy branch, financial control and payments for consumed energy;
development of a new Taxation Code; finding resources for covering the gas debts. Mr. Kuratchenko
sat on the boards of the national oil and gas corporation, Naftogaz Ukrainy", and the Cabinet's Council
of Exporters.
Apparently, after the collapse of Ukraine's fuel and energy complex, supervised directly by Mr.
Kuratchenko, the First Vice Prime Minister had slim chances to survive dismissal, so he decided to
extract at least some political pluses out of it by making a political statement and leaving proudly with
a scandal. The move would probably be appreciated by a new president whose perspectives on the need
for Ukraine to pursue economic transition coincide with Mr. Kuratchenko's if it were made some day in
mid-October, i.e., closer to the presidential election. Today, when it is too risky to predict the election
outcome, betting on a left-wing presidential hopeful can hardly be regarded as good strategic planning.
On the other hand, it was the government that benefited from Mr. Kuratchenko's action, as it received
the welcome opportunity to show unity of ranks in support of reform, to issue a memorandum showing
loyalty to the President's course, and to demonstrate determination in punishing the anti-market
"dissident". In this context, many observers are still wondering whether Mr. Kuratchenko had
swallowed the bait thrown by some skillful operators who then used his protest for their own purposes.
Apart from these speculations, it is hard to think of a reason why a top-ranking official would suddenly
decide to ignore the rules of the game that were clear for him from the very start, and make a public
statement instead of expressing his displeasure with the situation privately in a lobby or at a session of
the People's Democratic Party, chaired by Prime Minister Valery Pustovoitenko, to which most of
members of the government belong.
The closed session of the government issued a statement confirming its determination to pursue the
course towards economic transition and dismissing any attempts to return to Soviet-style planning and
to default on the state's domestic and international obligations, arguing that the radical change in the
course would cause a "civil conflict and international isolation of Ukraine".
Having signed the decree dismissing Mr. Kuratchenko, President Kuchma told journalists there was
"no crisis in the government". To support the claim, Minister of Finance Igor Mitiukov argued since
January 1999 that the government had managed to reduce the amount of wages and pension arrears by
3 percent. He did not go into detail how that was done; though admitted the budget revenue was well
below the planned level. The new appointment of Anatoly Kinakh, MP, chairman of the parliamentary
committee for industrial policy, leader of the Ukrainian League of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, to
the position of the First Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine also caused a number of questions. Mr. Kinakh
was viewed as a possible replacement for Prime Minister Pustovoitenko, and had good chances to
receive the position of the head of the government from a new president. The reason why he accepted
the rather uncomfortable position of the First Vice Premier is unclear - except the fact that some offers
are made in a way that they can hardly be rejected.
The government embarked on market transformations without accomplishing administrative reform. As
a result, the movement to the market is blocked by the unreformed state machine for which
deregulation, competition and equal opportunity would be devastating. Therefore, the government
continues to live according to the rules it has invented for itself. Volodymyr Kuratchenko said aloud
the thing many officials and experts understood: the current so-called "reform course" does not lead
anywhere. The structural disproportion in the economy that led to domination of raw material
excavation and heavy industries have not been corrected, the genuine market environment has not been
created, small and medium enterprises remain marginalized notwithstanding claims of "supporters" at
all levels. The base of stability and prosperity, the middle class, has shrunk compared even to early
1990s.
After his dismissal, Mr. Kuratchenko publicly stated he had been misunderstood and argued he had not
called for the return to the Soviet-style central planning. Instead, he argued that his proposals
corresponded with the President's reform course and the government's Agenda 2010. Taking into
account the government's actions to halt the rapid price rise in the energy sector instead of allowing
market self-regulation mechanisms to work, one may see that the economic model challenged by the
former First Vice Prime Minister is rather distant from what is traditionally viewed as a market
economy. Domestic consumers owe over 7 billion hryvnyas (about US$1.8 billion), but continue to
receive fuel from the so-called "state reserve", a relic of the Soviet era. It is the business of the First
Vice Prime Minister and the Minister of Energy to seek all sorts of barter schemes to fill the "state
reserve" and provide the economy with fuel, particularly needed in the harvest time. Selected traders,
close to the government, have been privileged to supply fuel and gas to consumers that are able to pay,
while energy companies have to supply energy to loss-making former industrial giants and budget-
funded institutions that have not paid for energy for years. Instead of taking measured to correct the
disproportion in the energy branch, the government engaged in searching for a scapegoat - and found
one.
Mr. Kuratchenko said he was only prepared to work in the incumbent president's team. However,
Prime Minister Valery Pustovoitenko said there was no vacancy in his government that he could fill.
Today the Ministry of Energy is short of at least 4.5 million tons of coal, needed by October 1 for the
winter season. Ukraine owes Russia US$ 1.8 billion in gas debts, only US$ 120 million of which has
been covered with goods supplied within the government's barter schemes. It is still unclear whether
Ukraine will be able to receive necessary amount of fuel for its nuclear power plants. Therefore, there
is little the government can do to avoid severe energy shortages and related economic problems,
particularly unwanted in the context of the forthcoming presidential election.
The "course of radical economic reform", announced by President Leonid Kuchma in October 1994,
differed dramatically from the "most acute issues" raised by recent sessions of the government that
focus almost exclusively on "building up industrial and agricultural production", "harvesting", "paying
up back wages, pensions and other social security transfers", "covering energy debts" and "preparing to
the winter period". In 1996, Leonid Kuchma's suggested "correction of the course of reform" disturbed
international creditors, donors and Ukrainian market reform advocates who argued that "correction"
was an inadequate for the reason no "course of reform" was in process. Today, the economic life
remains overregulated: according to deputy chairman of the State Committee for Enterprise
Development Volodymyr Zavhorodniy, currently there are about 100 governmental control and
inspection agencies and about 1,500 licenses to be secured by businessmen.
In mid-June 1999, 95% of 1,200 adult Ukrainians surveyed by the Socis-Gallup at the order of the
International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) said they were "generally dissatisfied" with the
situation in the country. The main reasons for their dissatisfaction included poor living conditions
(35%), unemployment (29%), payment arrears (27%) and economic instability (15%). According to the
poll results, the number of supporters of market economy decreased from 39% in 1997 to 27% in 1999,
while the number of advocates of command-planning economy remained practically unchanged (31%
and 30%, respectively). Within the same period the number of respondents who define the preferred
type of economy as a mixture of both market and centralized planning increased from 14% to 25%. In
1996, 43% of the respondents believed economic reforms should be pursued as fast as possible, and
13% supported "permanent small steps towards reform". In 1999 the figures changed to 23% of
confirmed supporters of fast reform and 33% of advocates of "small steps". When asked to evaluate the
real tempo of economic reform in Ukraine, 47% of the respondents said the reform process proceeded
"too slowly", and 33% said no reform occurred at all. 35% did not expect any changes in the economic
situation in a year, and 44% said the economic situation would further deteriorate.
Reshuffles in the highest ranks of the Cabinet of Ministers are unlikely to result in speeding up
economic reform. On the contrary, Mr. Kuratchenko's leftist agenda and the "unanimous" protest of
members of the Cabinet against his calls for the "correction of the reform course" may be used by the
executive branch as a demonstration of its determination to pursue economic reform, while making
concessions to advocates of centralized planning and the government's interference with economic
processes.
